Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Volume 11

Issue 3

Article 9

11-2013

G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler's Move
Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj

Janet Moore

Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Agriculture Law Commons, Arts and Humanities Commons,
Banking and Finance Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Commercial Law
Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Consumer Protection
Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Disability and Equity in Education
Commons, Disability Law Commons, Educational Leadership Commons, Educational Methods Commons,
Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Health
Law and Policy Commons, Housing Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law
Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Insurance Law Commons, Intellectual
Property Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, Labor and
Employment Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Psychology
Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal
Remedies Commons, Legislation Commons, Marketing Law Commons, National Security Law Commons,
Natural Resources Law Commons, Other Education Commons, Other Law Commons, Privacy Law
Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, Secured Transactions Commons, Securities Law
Commons, Sexuality and the Law Commons, Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, Social and
Philosophical Foundations of Education Commons, Social Welfare Law Commons, Transnational Law
Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Moore, Janet (2013) "G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler's Move Beyond Cost-Benefit
Analysis," Seattle Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 11: Iss. 3, Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol11/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

1025

G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew
Adler’s Move Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis
Janet Moore
I. INTRODUCTION
At crossroads marked by what social scientists call “concentrated
disadvantage,”1 poor people and people of color encounter crime and
criminal justice systems disproportionately and in multiple roles.2 Accusers
and victims, defendants and perpetrators, witnesses and bystanders—in high
crime areas, a single individual often bears two, three, or more of these
identities simultaneously.3



Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. JD/MA
(Philosophy), Duke University; MA (Divinity), University of Chicago. E-mail:
janet.moore@uc.edu. I thank Professor Robert Boruchowitz for inviting this contribution
to the Symposium. I thank Professors Matthew Adler, Robin West, Sandra Sperino, Felix
Chang, and Betsy Lenhart for helpful comments on prior drafts of this essay. Many of the
assertions made in this essay rely on MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR
DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012). All errors are my own.
Copyright © 2012 by Janet Moore.
1
Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories
of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 378–79 (2005) (“[T]he strongest and
most stable macro-level predictors of crime include racial heterogeneity . . . poverty,
and family disruption—factors typically treated as indicators of ‘concentrated
disadvantage.’”).
2
See, e.g., ERIKA HARRELL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: BLACK VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 1–3 (2007), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/bvvc.pdf. In 2005, nearly half of homicide victims and
nearly 40 percent of robbery victims in the United States were black. Id. at 1–3, 5.
Among crime victims, nearly 80 percent of African Americans and 70 percent of whites
are victims of intraracial crime, with blacks more likely than whites to be victims of
interracial crime. Id. at 5 & tbl. 5.
3
See id. at 1–3, 5 & tbl. 5.
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This essay highlights the role of the indigent criminal defendant. That
role warrants heightened scrutiny given the widely acknowledged crisis in
the provision of public defense services4 fifty years after the landmark rightto-counsel ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright.5 In light of that crisis, this essay
explores the implications of Matthew Adler’s extraordinary book, WellBeing and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis,6 for the
struggle to improve the quality of public defense and to address resource
disparities that drive (or, at minimum, are closely associated with)
disproportionate contact with crime and criminal justice systems by lowincome people and people of color.
For several reasons, Professor Adler’s book is an important resource for
academicians and activists who care about criminal justice issues generally,
as well as for those concerned more specifically with the quality of public
defense services. First, Adler provides an invaluable explanation and
expansion of social welfare economic theory. In his framing, this expressly
normative discipline resists the dominant economic paradigm’s cabining of
well-being to the satisfaction of personal preference. Adler’s turn on social
welfare economic theory is prioritarian: He focuses on the relative
contribution of large-scale policy decisions to enhanced individual wellbeing, with priority given to improving the lot of the less well-off.
Significantly, Adler also acknowledges the need to account for the extent to
which individuals shape their own opportunities and life histories. Personal
4

See, e.g., NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 93–95 (2009),
available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf; AMY BACH, ORDINARY
INJUSTICE 1328 (2009) (documenting system failures); Bruce A. Green, Criminal
Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1178–
85 (2003) (same).
5
372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (establishing Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel
for indigent defendants facing felony charges).
6
MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012).
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responsibility, or free will, must be incorporated as a variable in his
economic calculus.
In addition, while the arguments in Well-Being and Fair Distribution are
intricate, Adler presents them in patient, discursive detail. Therefore the
curious reader—even one uninitiated in the mathematical language of
economic theory that fills many pages and footnotes of Adler’s book—will
find him an able guide and translator. Adler’s arguments also are
interdisciplinary. Yet his command of the subject matter guarantees that a
broad spectrum of readers—from the trained economist, moral philosopher,
or legal theorist to the intellectually curious observer or social activist—will
find much to intrigue and to interrogate. Finally, Well-Being and Fair
Distribution is the hair of the dog—and should be gratefully received
amidst the latest bleary-eyed hangover caused by excessive celebration of
homo economicus and his relentless self-interest maximization.7
Gideon’s fiftieth anniversary is a timely occasion to note Adler’s
remarkable contribution to the scholarly literature, and to begin testing his
theoretical arguments in the real-world context of public defense services.
Gideon famously ensconced the indigent defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel in cases involving state-level felony charges.8
But in considering the implications of Adler’s theory for public defense
reform, it is important to recognize that Gideon shares a birthday with an
overshadowed twin, Douglas v. California.9
Instead of relying on the Sixth Amendment as in Gideon, the Douglas
Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment require appointment of counsel on direct appeal in
7

Cf. Janet Moore, Covenant and Feminist Reconstructions of Subjectivity Within
Theories of Justice, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 167–70 (1992) [hereinafter
Moore, Covenant and Subjectivity] (discussing alternatives to homo economicus and
individual self-interest maximization as models for human subjectivity).
8
372 U.S. at 339.
9
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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states that offer direct appeal as of right.10 Thus, Gideon and Douglas are
twin sons of different mothers. Just as well-being and fairness are tightly
intertwined in Adler’s theory, substantive and procedural justice are bound
up with inequality reduction in the development of right-to-counsel
doctrine.
This doctrinal history indicates that public defense can fit nicely within
Adler’s focus on fair, responsibility-sensitive distribution of well-being.
Defender services are idiosyncratic. They are a federal constitutional
positive-right mandate. They require redistribution of resources to people
who are by definition lower on any relevant scale of well-being.11 Yet
indigent criminal defendants are seldom viewed as ranking among the
“deserving poor.”12 To the contrary, with respect to Adler’s responsibilitysensitive approach, empirical research indicates that 20 percent of jurors
invert the due process presumption of innocence; as representatives of their
communities, these jurors presume instead that criminal defendants did
something bad to deserve being caught up in the system.13

10

Id. at 355–56.
Qualifying individuals by definition cannot afford to retain counsel. See, e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.101.010 (2012). As Justice Ginsberg has noted, 70 percent of defendants
represented by appointed counsel plead guilty, and 70 percent of those plea-convicted
defendants serve time in jail or prison. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 140 (2004)
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Nearly 70 percent of incarcerated inmates failed to graduate
high school, are in the lowest two of five literacy levels, and are therefore unable, for
example, to “use a bus schedule.” Id. Public defense cases also disproportionately involve
defendants suffering from mental illness. See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra
note 4, at 7.
12
See, e.g., Karen M. Tami, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a
Language of the State, 122 YALE L. J. 314, 323–26, n.42 (2012) (discussing the
construction of the “deserving poor” trope); Wendy A. Bach, Governance,
Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 239, 240, 248 (2010)
(same).
13
See Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and the
Presumption of Innocence: In the Hands of Real Jurors, Is Either of Them Safe?, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237, 247–49 (2006); see also Keith A. Findley & Michael S.
11
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Thus, public defense services satisfy Adler’s interest in fair,
responsibility-sensitive distribution of well-being. They also fit well within
his focus on large-scale policy matters. In 2007, expenditures on indigent
defense totaled more than $830 million.14 Significantly, that sum accounts
only for the minority of states (twenty-two) that handle funding on a
statewide basis as opposed to on a county or municipal basis.15
That magnitude of public expenditure easily meets Adler’s criterion for a
large-scale policy arena. Moreover, his insights may be especially useful to
proponents of public defense reform as a recent spate of cases expands the
mandate for appointed counsel. For example, in Halbert v. Michigan,16 the
Court invoked the equal protection analysis of Douglas to mandate
appointed counsel for plea-sentenced defendants seeking first-tier
discretionary appellate review. Even more recently, in Padilla v.
Kentucky,17 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel requires attorneys to caution defendants when a plea offer
implicates the collateral consequence of deportation. Notably, the Court
imposed these expanded duties in the face of apparently intractable
disparities in financial and other resources that simultaneously drive
demand for and hinder the provision of quality public defense services.18
The exacerbating public defense crisis requires reform advocates to mine
new resources for improving defender services. Part II contributes to that
Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
291, 340–41 (discussing prosecutorial presumptions of defendants’ guilt).
14
LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER PROGRAMS 2007 4 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub
/pdf/spdp07.pdf.
15
Id.
16
545 U.S. 605, 610–11 (2005).
17
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
18
See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text; see infra Part IV.B; see also Janet
Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (discussing solutions for the democracy deficit at the intersection of
crime, race, and poverty) [hereinafter Moore, Democracy Enhancement].
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effort by investigating Adler’s innovative work at the intersection of law,
moral philosophy, and economic theory. It is impossible to plumb the
depths of Well-Being and Fair Distribution in these few pages. I seek
instead to identify key steps in Adler’s analysis and to provoke interest
among scholars and practitioners in his formula for moral decision-making
in the context of large-scale policy matters.
But Adler acknowledges a number of challenging questions that are set
aside for future elaboration. He also sidesteps raging debates over some of
the first principles or working assumptions upon which his arguments rest.19
Part III touches on some of these questions and challenges.
Part IV responds to Adler’s more vociferous naysayers by using some of
his key concepts to analyze the arrested development of the indigent
defendant’s right to appointed counsel. This Part queries whether a moral
decision-making process akin to Adler’s continuous prioritarian social
welfare function may have informed the development of right-to-counsel
doctrine. The brief discussion here anticipates future elaboration of this
analysis and argument. An expanded inquiry should assess, for example,
any role that Adler’s form of inequality-averse decision-making has played
in the genesis of exemplary public defense systems and other attempts to
redress the systemic disparities that are linked with the causes and
consequences of crime.
This essay concludes by calling for refinement of Adler’s methodology to
prioritize democracy enhancement at the intersection of crime, race, and
poverty. Movement beyond reform efforts driven by elites and toward a
regime in which low income people and people of color are empowered to
ask their own criminal justice policy questions, to form their own coalitions,
and to advocate for their own solutions remains, at this writing, an elusive

19
See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 6, at xiii (“[T]his book works within welfarism, rather
than engaging ongoing debates between welfarists and non-welfarists.”).
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hope.20 It is my own hope that broader awareness of Adler’s excellent work
will help to transform that possibility into a reality.

II. INEQUALITY AVERSION AND THE MOVE BEYOND COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
This Part summarizes Adler’s purpose in writing Well-Being and Fair
Distribution and identifies key concepts in his argument. The prioritarian
focus on improving the lot of the less well-off is critical to his theory’s
relevance in the real-world struggle for public defense reform. Unpacking
that connection requires close attention to Adler’s integration of moral
philosophy and economic analysis. Part II.A discusses Adler’s stance on
several overarching or “metaethical” controversies that necessarily
influence the elucidation of any moral decision-making procedure,
including his own. Part II.B tracks Adler’s struggle to capture the crucial,
yet elusive meaning of “well-being.” Part II.C identifies economic
principles that are pivotal to Adler’s theory, and traces their role in his
argument.
A. Practical Purpose and First Premises
Professor Adler’s goal in Well-Being and Fair Distribution is as precise
as his prose. Using rigorous deductive analysis, he designs a procedure for
morally evaluating large-scale policy choices. The procedure ranks decision
outcomes according to their relative enhancement of individual well-being,
with priority given to improving the lot of the less well-off.21 Adler’s intent
is practical. He wants policymakers to apply his decision-making procedure

20
Cf. Bach, supra note 12, at 266–69 (critiquing “nonexistent” or “ineffective”
participation by affected communities in construction and oversight of poverty-reduction
programs).
21
ADLER, supra note 6, at 78.
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within real-world constraints of limited knowledge, uncertain and changing
externalities, and the absence of anything like a free lunch.
Adler begins by laying out four initial premises. Three of these premises
are substantive and one is procedural. For many readers, Adler’s first
premise will be the most controversial. His moral universe is personcentered. Animals and environmental concerns are excluded, except as
hypothetically relevant to the pursuit of human well-being.
Adler cites Kant, Rawls, Scanlon, and “[a]ll of welfare economics” to
support his anthropocentric starting point.22 In this view, only humans have
the capacity to establish and follow moral norms—those “ought” principles
for guiding conduct that apply fairly to all individuals. For Adler, this
unique capacity for moral reasoning makes human beings the only entities
to whom the concept of fair distribution can properly apply.
Adler claims agnosticism regarding metaethical controversies. But his
person-centered starting premises are deeply rooted in the neoKantian
tradition. That methodology celebrates the concept of autonomy, or moral
self-rule via the individual’s rational generation and acceptance of binding
normative principles.23 Additional evidence of a neoKantian influence
includes Adler’s arguments that the “separateness of persons”24 and the
reification of each individual human being as “a distinct source of moral
concerns” justify the goal of distributing well-being fairly.25 Also salient is

22

Id. at 5, 8–9 nn.12–16.
See, e.g., ANDREWS REATH, AGENCY AND AUTONOMY IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY:
SELECTED ESSAYS 137–38 (2006).
24
ADLER, supra note 6, at 314–17 & n.15 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
10–15 (1999)); id. at 439–42 & n.59 (citing THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND
PARTIALITY 69 (1995)); see also Ian Ward, Another Look at the New Rawls, 24 ANGLOAM. L. REV. 104, 120–21 (1995) (discussing Rawls in the context of neoKantianism).
25
ADLER, supra note 6, at 29.
23
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his adoption of the contested proposition that personal identity is continuous
throughout an individual’s lifetime.26
Adler’s insistence on the unique, nonfungible moral significance of each
individual’s personhood fits well with core concerns animating right-tocounsel doctrine, including the “peculiarly sacred” vindication of individual
liberty in the face of concentrated government power.27 There is similar
resonance between the constitutional interests in fairness and equal
treatment that underpin right-to-counsel doctrine and Adler’s second,
closely related criterion for moral decision-making: impartiality. This
second criterion might be captured more precisely as a demand for the
exercise of moral imagination.28 By definition, moral norms cannot be of
wholly idiosyncratic origin or application. More specifically, the ranking of
outcomes in Adler’s moral decision-making procedure must itself function
impartially—that is, equally across persons—as to the interests of the
individuals whose well-being the procedure is designed to enhance.
But these initial premises beg a critical question: How precisely are
binding moral norms to be generated? Adler answers this procedural
question by invoking the concept of reflective equilibrium. He cites the
imprimatur of “the vast majority of contemporary moral philosophers” for
this methodological choice.29 Reflective equilibrium is the deliberative
26

Id. at 406, 409–14; see also Moore, Covenant and Subjectivity, supra note 7, at 159–
62, 186–89 (discussing contested meanings of subjectivity). But see ADLER, supra note 6,
at 269–70 n.47 (probing boundaries of essential properties of personhood).
27
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447 (1940) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 37475 (1892)).
28
Compare Moore, Covenant and Subjectivity, supra note 7, at 188–89 (arguing for
“imaginative participation in another’s life-world”), with ADLER, supra note 6, at 31
(“[A] willingness to consider choice from a broader perspective that encompasses other
persons’ interests, relationships, projects and attachments, not just the agent’s own, is the
hallmark of any variant of moral thinking.”).
29
ADLER, supra note 6, at 21; cf. Ward, supra note 24, at 104, 120–21 (discussing
Kant’s explication of the sensus communis and citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE
OF JUDGMENT 150–54 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990)).
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process through which participants test their moral intuitions and principles
against competing principles and against concrete facts. Participants revise
intuitions and principles that are incommensurate either with more attractive
competing intuitions and principles or with the obstinacy of real-world facts
in particular cases.
Adler readily concedes that reflective equilibrium is methodologically
distinct from (if not alien to) the deductive logic and mathematical proofs
that form the core of much economic theory. This is so whether or not
moral deliberation is undertaken by individuals abstracted from the concrete
particulars of existence, like the crowd separated from themselves and each
other by the Rawlsian veil.30 But as Adler demonstrates, formal
mathematical proofs yield many logically possible formulae for making
large-scale moral decisions to enhance human well-being. He concludes
that to evaluate those competing alternative decision structures, “[t]here
really is no other game in town” than the “fuzzier and more contestable”
process of reflective equilibrium.31
Adler’s third substantive criterion for a moral decision-making
procedure, in addition to person-centeredness and impartiality, is
transcendence from social norms or conventions. Moral judgment is
necessarily critical. It distinguishes better from worse. Adler concludes
from these observations that moral judgment necessarily stands apart from
that which is judged and therefore cannot be merely coextensive with
existing social practices, including law.
The contestable notion of moral judgment’s detachment from social
practice is less pivotal to Adler’s reasoning than his unobjectionable
premise that critical moral judgment can motivate movement from the
descriptive is to a normative ought. As discussed above, Adler’s ought is
30

See RAWLS, supra note 24, at 136–38 (discussing the hypothetical veil of ignorance
behind which individuals generate principles of justice).
31
ADLER, supra note 6, at 22.
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consequentialist: He focuses on the outcomes of decision-making by largescale policymakers, and offers a framework for ranking outcomes to favor
the enhancement of individual human well-being. As was also previously
noted, Adler’s ought is prioritarian: His methodology gives preference to
choices that improve the lot of the less well-off. Each of these emphases
resonates with core commitments of public defense reformers.
But Adler’s insistence that this type of decision-making is moral—and
therefore transcends social norms, including law—problematizes any leap
to codify his decision-making process as a procedural mandate. Importantly,
he does not draw the inverse conclusion. He does not deny that prioritarian
moral decision-making can produce legal mandates. Part IV begins
exploring the evidence that the federal constitutional right to appointed
counsel emerged through just such a process, that is, a process of reflective
equilibrium in a person-centered framework emphasizing impartiality and
fairness through inequality reduction and improvement of the lot of the less
well-off.
B. Platitudes and the Meaning of “Well-Being”
Simply by establishing the foregoing initial premises for his more
detailed arguments, Adler supplies readers previously innocent of economic
theory’s complex variations with a series of refreshing “Aha!” moments. As
he correctly observes, some readers will be surprised to learn that costbenefit analysis “is a kind of moral decision procedure.”32 But he is too
modest here. For some, the existence of social welfare economics as a
discipline will be news. Still others will wonder at the confidence of his
proclamation, pace Twain, that reports of this discipline’s demise have been
greatly exaggerated.33
32

Id. at 12.
Id. at 89; cf. JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 562:13 (17th ed.,
2002) (quoting a June 1, 1897, note from Mark Twain to a reporter for the N.Y. JOURNAL

33
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Adler’s book is important because he makes these discoveries possible
(or, at minimum, offers elegant arguments that can inspire critical
reflection) for readers whose views of economic theory are shaped primarily
by Chicago-school free market and libertarian analyses. Well-Being and
Fair Distribution offers food for thought to those who, with Alan
Greenspan, were “shocked” by the most recent evidence that their “model
[for] . . . the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works”
contained “a flaw” despite decades of “very considerable evidence” that the
model worked “exceptionally well.”34 The model’s unanticipated “flaw”
was the unreliability of self-interest as the lodestar of a healthy economy.
Adler’s book also offers much for anyone who was shocked that Greenspan
was shocked.35
An economic theory that shifts the analysis from gross satisfaction of
personal preference to inequality reduction can be a powerful tool for public
defense reform advocates. Adler lays out the core components of that new
framework as follows. First, he clearly marks the points at which he
declines to engage in ongoing and often fierce debates among economists
and among moral philosophers. For example, he sidelines the dispute

stating, “[t]he report of my death was an exaggeration.”). But see, e.g., Daniel M.
Hausman, Review, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, 28
ECON. & PHIL 435, 436 (2012) (“Despite the genius with which the approach is
developed, the approach is, I believe, hopeless; and the very genius with which it is
developed establishes this conclusion.”), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action
/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=8764394&jid=EAP&volumeId=28&issueId=03&aid=8764
392&newWindow=Y; Mark Sagoff, Review, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond
Cost-Benefit Analysis, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV., Dec. 4, 2012 (describing Adler’s book
as “so brilliant it does not just bang another nail in the coffin of welfare economics. It is
the coffin itself.”), available at http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/36051-well-being-and-fairdistribution-beyond-cost-benefit-analysis.
34
The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Governmental Reform, 110th Cong. 46 (2008) (statement of Dr.
Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank) (transcript available at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20081023100438.pdf).
35
See, e.g., Moore, Covenant and Subjectivity, supra note 7, at 167–70.
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between advocates and opponents of social welfare economics. Instead, he
“works within welfarism”36 and strives to make the rigor and
comprehensiveness of his argument structure attractive to adherents and
skeptics alike. He also situates his arguments within a consequentialist
moral philosophical tradition—that is, one focused on production of good
outcomes, with “goodness” encompassing considerations of fair
distribution—while giving a brief nod to critiques of that tradition.37
As noted above, metaethical disputes comprise one topic upon which
Adler claims agnosticism. He tries to avoid staking any claims on this
“treacherous ground.”38 Take the debate over the ontological status of moral
facts or assertions. As Adler explains, some insist that moral assertions,
such as “Truth-telling is good,” lack any independent, external referent, and
simply reveal information about the speaker’s preference, plan, or emotion.
Others view moral facts as products of a hypothetical setting in which the
preferences of fully rational, informed, and impartial participants converge.
Still others perceive moral facts as entities existing independent of human
intervention. In this view, a moral assertion can be as true or false as the
statement, “The Earth revolves around the Sun.”
Adler leans toward the intermediate stance (the convergent preference
model) in defining “well-being.” The meaning of the term “well-being”
obviously is critical to his analysis. But he views resolution of the
underlying dispute about the true nature of moral facts as unnecessary to
acceptance of his arguments by members of opposing philosophical camps.
Instead, he invites readers of any persuasion to be persuaded by the
elegance of his logic.
Adler also acknowledges diversity of opinion on the precise definition of
well-being. Indeed, his systematic engagement with this key contested issue
36
37
38

ADLER, supra note 6, at xviii.
Id. at 24–32.
Id. at 19.
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in moral philosophy is one of the joys of Well-Being and Fair Distribution.
That engagement includes the poignant observation that “reaching a point
of reflective equilibrium with respect to the nature of well-being is
difficult.”39 In the end, by leaning toward the convergent-preference model
for defining well-being, Adler intends to accommodate varying accounts.
As he relates, some philosophers (and many economists) champion a
liberal definition of well-being in terms of the satisfaction of individual
preferences or desires. Others assess the quality of internal mental states.
From the Benthamite-utilitarian perspective, for example, the relevant
question is whether a particular choice will increase pleasure or pain.40 Still
others identify objective goods that constitute human well-being.
Philosophers’ checklists of objective goods range from life and health,
through the existence of other species and play, to interpersonal
relationships and aesthetic sensibilities.41
From this “blooming, buzzing confusion,”42 Adler teases out three basic
principles (or “platitudes”)43 incorporated into any meaningful conception
of well-being. First, the concept of well-being “has critical force. In other
words, an individual can be mistaken about his own well-being.”44 That
principle would indeed be a platitude to the parent of any teenager, and
Adler views the majority of philosophers as accepting it. He includes
philosophers whose definition of well-being lies at the liberal, preferencesatisfaction end of the spectrum. But he concedes that many economists
would reject the idea out of skepticism toward any normative evaluation of
others’ goals and preferences.
39

Id. at 170.
Id. at 162–63.
41
Id. at 165–69.
42
WILLIAM JAMES, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 462 (Frederick H. Burkhardt et
al. eds., 1981).
43
ADLER, supra note 6, at 170.
44
Id.
40
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Second, the concept of well-being must have “motivational force.”45
Well-being is a good outcome for an individual subject. As between two
outcomes, if one is better and one is worse the subject would be motivated
to choose the former. But echoing his earlier lament about the difficulty of
defining well-being, Adler confesses that “what exactly it means for an
outcome to be better for an individual is elusive.”46
Instead he identifies a third principle or platitude underlying the concept
of well-being. The concept must involve more immediate than remote
alternative outcomes. An outcome’s immediacy and remoteness could
relate, for example, to time, geography, or intensity of personal relationship.
The connection between an influence, choice, or outcome and an
individual’s well-being attenuates asymptotically as the consequence
becomes less immediate (or more remote).47
Ultimately, as noted above, Adler relies on an abstract conceptual
methodology to generate a definition of well-being. Well-being, for his
purposes, is defined by the convergent preferences of fully rational,
informed, and impartial participants striving together toward reflective
equilibrium. He modifies that open-ended striving by giving the participants
a defined subject for deliberation: the extended life-history.48 This concept
is critical for Adler’s move beyond cost-benefit analysis or other economic
applications that resist the interpersonal comparisons necessary to assessing
fair distribution of well-being and prioritization of the interests of the less
well-off.

45

Id. at 173.
Id.
47
Id. at 174–78. Adler admits that the issue of remoteness in the definition of well-being
has been of far more concern to philosophers than economists. Id. at 178.
48
Id. at 49, 102, 155–56.
46
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C. Pareto and Pigou-Dalton
It is worth reiterating here that Adler focuses on social welfare economics
as a source for making moral decisions about large-scale policy choices.
Because he works within welfarism, his decision-making model aims at
maximizing human well-being. Yet he expressly rejects utilitarianism’s
definition of the “good” as an aggregation of satisfied preferences. Instead,
he wants a decision-making model that is sensitive to fair distribution of
well-being. Fairness is in turn a criterion for his model because he views
each individual as a separate, unique focus of moral concern. Finally,
fairness, in Adler’s framework, prioritizes outcomes that improve wellbeing for the less well-off.
These preliminary commitments require a mechanism for interpersonal,
as opposed to merely intrapersonal, comparisons of individual well-being.
Adler offers the concept of the life-history as a foundation for making those
interpersonal comparisons. He explains the crucial concept of life-history as
follows.
For each individual i or j in the universe of individuals deliberating over
the definition and pursuit of well-being, there can be posited a mathematical
expression of the relationship between i and the outcome of his or her entire
life.49 As noted above, Adler presumes that the individual personal identities
of i and j remain separate, constant and nonfungible throughout the course
of i’s and j’s respective lives.50 The universe of possible entire outcomes for
i and j can be denoted as containing x, y, and z, where these outcomes
represent descriptions of all possible past, present, and future histories.51 A
life-history is the pairing of one individual from the universe of individuals
with one outcome from the universe of possible outcomes. Pairings would

49
50
51

Id. at 49–50.
See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
ADLER, supra note 6, at 49–50.
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be expressed, for example, as i’s life in x outcome (x; i) and j’s life in
outcome y (y; j).52
It is now possible to begin ranking life-histories. Here Adler introduces
readers unacquainted with economic theory to some of the discipline’s basic
axioms. These include the Pareto and Pigou-Dalton principles. A decisionmaking system that strives to maximize human well-being can satisfy the
Pareto-indifference principle if it is possible to compare two different lifehistories—that is, two different entire outcomes for the same person [(x; i)
and (y; i)] and identify outcomes in which i is equally well-off.53 That
decision-making procedure reveals that x and y have the same moral worth,
and ranks those outcomes equally.54
But a decision-making system also must be able to evaluate outcomes in
terms of the strong and weak Pareto principles.55 The former tests for
outcomes such that at least one individual is better off in outcome x than in
outcome y, and for everyone else, x and y are at least equally good. In that
setting, x is morally better than y.56 Weak Pareto provides another method
for ranking outcomes: If each participant is better off in outcome x than in
outcome y, then x beats y in terms of moral worth.57
A problem arises because some outcomes are Pareto-noncomparable. For
example, it may be the case that i’s well-being is better in x than in y, but j’s
well-being is better in y than in x [(x; i) > (y; i) but (x; j) < (y; j)].58 Or
outcome x could be better for the well-being of a few people than is
outcome y, while x is worse for the well-being of more people than is

52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id. at 52–56.
Id. at 52–55.
Id. at 53–55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55–56.

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 3 • 2013

1042 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

outcome y [(x; i, j, k) > (y; i, j, k) but (x; l, m, n . . . z) < (y; l, m, n . . . z)].59
Adler sets himself the task of providing a mechanism to rank the moral
value of these tougher, Pareto-noncomparable outcomes.
Adler voices some skepticism about the ability systematically to compare
well-being across different individuals, particularly using the deductive
logic of economic theory. He asks,
[W]hat is the most attractive account of well-being? Why believe
that it allows for interpersonal comparisons? What would such
comparisons consist of? And even if interpersonal comparisons are
possible, how do we construct numerical utilities that represent the
well-being ranking of life-histories or the well-being differences
between life-histories?60
Adler answers this question in part through the concept of extended
preferences. These are constructed as participants seek reflective
equilibrium regarding the fair distribution of well-being by ranking the
universe of life-histories according to both preference (their own selfinterested preference as well as other-interested preferences) and probability
(the likelihood that a given life-history will come to fruition).61 Within the
universe of these ranked life-histories, it is then possible to evaluate the
differences between various pairs of life-histories and make moral
judgments about better and worse outcomes across persons.
Enter the Pigou-Dalton principle. This is a mechanism for prioritizing the
reduction of inequality. In other words, a moral decision-making procedure
that maximizes individual well-being also satisfies Pigou-Dalton “if it gives
greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse-off individuals.”62 In
Adler’s schematic, the principle has four premises and a conclusion. If (1)

59
60
61
62

Id.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 201–02.
Id. at 78.
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Jamila’s well-being is greater than Isaac’s in outcome y and greater than or
equal to Isaac’s in outcome x; (2) Isaac’s well-being is greater in x than in y,
but the reverse holds true for Jamila; (3) the differences between Jamila’s
well-being in x and y and Isaac’s well-being in x and y are equal; and (4) no
one else is affected by the difference between x and y, then x is morally
better than y. 63
In terms of ranked life histories, the premises would look like this:64
(1) (y; j) > (y; i) and (x; j) > (x; i)
(2) (x; i) > (y; i) and (y; j) > (x; j)
(3) [(y; j) - (x; j)] = [(x; i) - (y; i)]
(4) (x; k, l, m . . . z) = (y; k, l, m . . . z)
Another way to state premises (1) and (2) is:
(y; j) > (x; j) > (x; i) > (y; i)
Put that way, it is easy to see that Jamila’s well-being is greater than Isaac’s
in y and greater than or equal to Isaac’s in x. Conversely, Isaac is worse off
in y and at least as well off as Jamila in x. Because the Pigou-Dalton
principle prioritizes reduction of inequality, as long as the interpersonal
well-being differences between Jamila and Isaac are equal as between lifehistories in x or y, it is morally better to improve Isaac’s well-being.65
Adler captures the moral impetus favoring improvement in the well-being
of the less well-off in terms of a graphically illustrated mathematical
equation.66 The equation is sufficiently complicated that it will not be
reproduced here. But the x:y-axis graph is readily imagined. A curved line
begins at (0,0) and ascends steadily in an arc that is concave with respect to

63
64
65
66

See id. at 339.
See id. at 340.
See id. at 79.
Id. at 72, 79, 553.
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the x-axis. Overall utility increases along the x-axis. Thus, an individual
with more well-being (Jamila) would be to the right at point j from Isaac,
who would be at some lesser well-being point i closer to (0,0).67 A “g
function” transforms utility along the y-axis. Crucially, that transformation
decreases inequality, but in such a way that Jamila’s loss in well-being
would never exceed Isaac’s gain.68
Thus, Adler’s g-function drives change in a particular direction—a
continuous prioritarian direction that emphasizes improvement in wellbeing for the less well-off. He notes that purely utilitarian decision-making
processes, like cost-benefit analysis, cannot satisfy Pigou-Dalton’s demand
for sensitivity to fair distribution of well-being across persons.69 In Adler’s
calculus, the inequality-aversion factor (denoted as ɤ) would prioritize
higher levels of improvement for the less well-off as inequality increases.
At maximum levels of inequality, ɤ would asymptotically approach
“absolute priority [for] worse-off individuals.”70 Conversely, ɤ would yield
a more utilitarian prioritization of collective well-being as inequality
drops.71
D. Summing Up
Adler’s arguments warrant attention because they offer a new way to
promote decision-making in large-scale policy settings aimed at improving
the lot of the less well-off. Those settings include the struggle to improve
public defense services. Adler’s neoKantian insistence on the nonfungible
value of each person resonates with constitutional interests in securing
67

See id. at 79.
See id. at 72, 79 (describing this transformed utility function, g(u), as “strictly
increasing and strictly concave”); id. at 79 (showing that the g function continually
decreases inequality with priority of change favoring the less well-off.)
69
Id. at 78.
70
Id. at 383–87, 553.
71
Id. at 387.
68
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liberty and equal, fair treatment, particularly in confrontations between the
individual and concentrated government power. Adler’s application of
economic theory’s deductive logic opens the way toward the interpersonal
comparisons of well-being that can support an inequality-averse “g
function” that is attentive to fair, responsibility-sensitive distribution.
To be clear, this essay’s brief introduction to some key concepts and
arguments in Well-Being and Fair Distribution cannot do justice to Adler’s
detailed discussion. Nor will this essay present a thoroughgoing critique of
the book’s complex interdisciplinary arguments. Adler acknowledges a
number of challenging questions that are set aside for future elaboration. He
also sidesteps fierce debates over some of his first principles and working
assumptions. Part III touches on some of those unresolved issues, which
will influence the application of Adler’s theory in real-world contexts such
as public defense reform.

III. PROBLEMS, PUZZLES, AND PROVING GROUNDS
Adler’s arguments face heavy fire from scholars who are averse to the
possibilities that well-being could be subject to interpersonal comparison or
that the well-being of one may be sacrificed to improve the lot of others on
any terms properly denominated as “moral.”72 With respect to the first
concern, classically liberal angst spikes with any trenching on the
autonomous individual’s freedom to choose his or her ends.73 But it takes a
radical skeptic to dismiss even the abstract possibility of discovering
common ground through deliberative processes. (That’s what democracy is
supposed to look like.) And at least some readers will find Adler’s novel
challenge to the hegemony of classical liberalism’s autonomous self-

72

See, e.g., Sagoff, supra note 33, (“[w]arn[ing] against the fatal conceit” of
“[a]pparatchiks of a Welfarist Party . . . enforc[ing] their own views of what counts as an
informed, fully rational, extended preference.”).
73
See id.
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interest-maximizer74 to be a chief source of interest in a complex and
challenging set of arguments.
The second concern sparks greater interest. Daniel Hausman is a leading
scholar in the philosophy of economics who faults Adler for the “startling”
claim that “concerns about fairness exhaust morality.”75 Hausman also
alleges that Adler “explicitly defends” the premise that “small benefits to
enough well-off individuals can compensate for harms to very badly off
individuals.”76
Both criticisms seem overstated. As noted in Part II, Adler strives
through his anthropocentric insistence on the primacy and separateness of
persons to champion the indissoluble and non-fungible moral worth of each
individual human being.77 It is here that his neoKantian approach diverges
quite sharply from utilitarianism’s bald willingness to sacrifice the interests
of one to the collective good of the many.
Adler does adopt a rebuttable assumption that fairness is a sufficient
moral criterion within his own welfarist framework. He cites Rawls as a
comrade-in-arms.78 Yet he also justifies his working assumption by
reiterating the expansive definition and role of fairness within his theory.
For Adler, fairness
provides an overarching structure for determining the normative
significance of facts about human well-being. All of the various
aspects of an individual’s welfare determine the valence of her
claim between a given pair of outcomes.79

74

See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
Hausman, supra note 33, at 438.
76
Id. at 441.
77
See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
78
See ADLER, supra note 6, at 338–39 & n.54 (discussing RAWLS, supra note 24, at 15,
93–98).
79
Id. at 338.
75
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In other words, the concept of fairness is tightly linked with the “allthings-considered” reflective equilibrium process that generates definitions
of well-being, rankings of life-histories, and the corresponding interpersonal
moral claims of individuals to increased well-being.80 This genesis of
fairness—a kind of Immaculate Conception—may inspire awe (or
incredulity). But given this genesis, Adler’s claim for the sufficiency of
fairness as a moral criterion within his social welfare framework is, perhaps
ironically, considerably more modest than Hausman suggests.
Nor does Adler champion a “Numbers Win” subordination of a worse-off
individual’s interests to the collective improvement of the better-off. To the
contrary, in his calculus the g-function prioritizes increased well-being for
the less well-off. Adler argues that despite possessing the “Numbers Win”
feature, a continuous prioritarian social welfare decision-making structure is
optimal for large-scale policy matters.81
Adler further notes that many find “Numbers Win” to be an
“unattractive” feature of continuous prioritarian social welfare decisionmaking structures.82 He describes “Numbers Win” as “very troubling,”83
“unfortunate,”84 and a “deficit” for this type of decision-making
procedure.85 He attempts, perhaps unpersuasively, to ameliorate the effects
of the “Numbers Win” feature with a modifier. Where decreases in wellbeing for an individual are “sufficiently small,” he proposes that some
fraction of that loss—“perhaps a very small fraction”—should be capable of
being “trumped by benefits to a sufficiently large number of people.”86

80
81
82
83
84
85
86

See id. at 201–02, 337 nn.52–53.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 360.
Id. & n.87.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 377–78.
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Although future scholarship will doubtless develop more fully the extant
and potential critiques of Well-Being and Fair Distribution, several
noteworthy questions arise in the context of criminal justice policy reform
and in the more specific setting of public defense services. One pressing
item on Adler’s own “to-do” list is a more complete account of the meaning
and role of individual responsibility in a continuous prioritarian moral
decision-making procedure.87 How can systems appropriately “distinguish
between individuals who are responsible for being badly off and those who
are badly off through no fault of their own”?88
The closing pages of Well-Being and Fair Distribution offer several
angles from which to tackle that important task. As Adler notes,
determining aspects of a life-history for which individuals can and should
be held accountable “implicat[es] one of the deepest philosophical
puzzles—free will.”89 Again, the high salience of these issues in the
criminal justice setting is indisputable. Criminal law and procedure
constitute a proving ground in theoretical and practical struggle over the
scope and meaning of personal responsibility. In delineating the appropriate
boundaries of regulatory authority between individual, community, and the
concentrated power of government, the discipline perpetually teeters over
the divide between deontology and teleology, retributivism and
deterrence.90
Thus, criminal justice issues provide an excellent context within which to
test and refine Adler’s arguments, particularly in elaborating the role of free
will as compared to conditioned choice or luck. On this point, interesting
subjects for future analysis include the definition and functionality of
87

Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 579.
89
Id. at 584.
90
This point is commonly driven home in the opening pages of first-year criminal law
casebooks. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1–3, 30–48 (2012).
88
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incentives. Also important are debates over the existence and effect of
implicit racial or ethnic bias,91 and the extent to which structural inequalities
have racially invariant consequences.92
At a more fundamental level, the architecture of the reflective
equilibrium process is subject to challenge. Recall that Adler aims to bridge
the gap between theory and practice. He seeks to augment cost-benefit
analysis as an applied methodology for governing large-scale policy choices
with a continuous prioritarian social welfare process that is sensitive to
responsibility—that is, the exercise of individual free will. In the real world,
what mechanisms can promote equal participation by the less well-off in
constructing consensus over the definition of well-being? Are there any
assurances that consensus will reflect more than the extended preferences of
elites?
Adler’s move from theory to practice requires simplification of possible
life-history outcome and utility sets “so that individuals and social planners

91
See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Supply Side or Discrimination? Assessing the Role of
Unconscious Bias, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 877, 887–902 (2011) (surveying literature and
challenging empirical support for unconscious bias as a causal factor capable of objective
proof or redress through law). But see, e.g., State v. Golphin, Nos. 97 CRS 47314-15, slip
op. at 2–4, 19–28 (Cumberland Cnty., N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (vacating three
defendants’ death sentences based on finding of prosecutors’ intentional and implicit
racial bias in capital jury selection), available at http://www.law.msu.edu/racialjustice/Golphin-et-al-RJA-Order.pdf. The state legislature subsequently repealed the
Racial Justice Act that made these findings possible. See Moore, Democracy
Enhancement, supra note 18 (discussing Act’s history, implementation, and repeal;
citing, inter alia, Act of June 13, 2013, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 154, § 5(a-d), repealing
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010-2012 (2012).
92
Compare, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Lydia Bean, Cultural Mechanisms and Killing
Fields, in THE MANY COLORS OF CRIME 8, 11 (Ruth D. Peterson et al. eds., 2006)
(discussing “resilient” invariance findings related to “factors representing disadvantage,
e.g., differing combinations of poverty, income, family disruption, joblessness, and
unemployment”) with Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Structural
Disadvantage and Crime: White, Black, and Hispanic Comparisons, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 799,
800 (2012) (“[T]he degree to which differences across groups in structural disadvantage
predict racial or ethnic differences in violence is far from settled.”).
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can actually think about them.”93 He sets aside the “thorny, and perhaps
insoluble,” challenge of justifying what is included or excluded during that
process of simplification.94 He also describes social constructs such as race
and gender as “cognitively immutable,” that is, as factors that are difficult
to set aside for people who “possess the attribute[s].”95 Adler sees that
cognitive immutability problematizes the conditions of full information and
rationality necessary for the ranking of life-histories and utility sets.96 He
“very much hope[s]” that the fully informed, rational evaluators would not
be influenced by socially-constructed status identifiers in the evaluative
process.97 Realizing this hope may prove elusive.98
These and other challenging aspects of Adler’s analysis await more
comprehensive critical analysis. My goals here are simply to sketch key
aspects of his argument for a continuous prioritarian decision-making
model, to note some areas for future refinement and development of the
argument, and to take some initial steps toward testing the argument’s
application in the real-world context of the struggle for improved public
defense services.
It is to the latter task that this essay now turns. As discussed in Part IV,
the indigent criminal defendant’s right to appointed counsel is embedded in
a complex socioeconomic setting. It is a context in which both well-being
and fair distribution are perpetually contested and at risk. Exploring the
development of right-to-counsel doctrine as a real-world instantiation of
Adler’s theory may help to counter arguments that would classify Well-

93
94
95
96
97
98

ADLER, supra note 6, at 246.
Id. at 246, 258.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id. at 274–75.
See Moore, Democracy Enhancement, supra note 18.
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Being and Fair Distribution with The Sound and the Fury—as a “splendid
failure.”99

IV. WELL-BEING, FAIR DISTRIBUTION, AND THE RIGHT TO
APPOINTED COUNSEL
Despite the questions and challenges facing Adler’s innovative
arguments for a continuous prioritarian decision-making procedure, his
focus on inequality-averse improvements in well-being for the less well-off
warrants further investigation for academicians and activists interested in
reforming criminal justice systems generally and public defense systems in
particular. This Part begins that investigation. Part IV.A interrogates the
seminal cases in the development of right-to-counsel doctrine, and identifies
a decision-making process similar to Adler’s at work. Part IV.B summarizes
the practical failures of right-to-counsel doctrine, and calls for modification
of Adler’s approach to improve the applicability of the continuous
prioritarian social welfare model in the real-world context of justice reform.
A. Powell and Prioritarianism
An exemplar of prioritarian social welfare decision-making may lie in the
tangled roots of the indigent criminal defendant’s federal constitutional
right to appointed counsel. This distinctive constitutional positive right
mandates redistribution of resources to those who by definition occupy
lower rungs on the ladder of socioeconomic well-being.100 And the doctrinal
history reveals an ongoing struggle toward consensus on the right’s
justification and scope.

99
Compare Sagoff, supra note 33, and Hausman, supra note 33, with Kathleen Hulley,
The Most Splendid Failure: Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, 8 REVUE FRANÇAISE
D’ÉTUDES AMÉRICAINES 260 (1979) (book review).
100
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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The complex and sometimes overlapping sources of the right to
appointed counsel include the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment,101 as well as the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of “Assistance of Counsel” for federal defendants102 and the incorporation
of that federal right via the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the
states.103 Albeit in a herky-jerk trajectory, the right to appointed counsel has
steadily expanded in scope from its original application as a due process
corrective in Powell v. Alabama.104
As has been discussed in detail elsewhere,105 the truncated capital
proceedings in Powell arose squarely at the intersection of crime, race, and
poverty. The defendants were young African American men accused of
raping two white women.106 They were tried under circumstances just shy
of a courthouse lynching,107 or, in the words of the Powell majority,
“judicial murder.”108

101

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 35658 (1963) (establishing due process and
equal protection rights to appointed appellate counsel in jurisdictions providing direct
appeal as of right); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (establishing due process
right to timely appointment of counsel for capital trials).
102
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 46768 (1938).
103
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (requiring appointed counsel for
indigent defendants facing felony charges); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27
(1972) (requiring appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing misdemeanor
charges).
104
Powell, 287 U.S. at 6465.
105
See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Confronts
“Legal Lynchings,” in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 1 (Carol B. Steiker ed., 2006).
106
Id.
107
Id. The young men “ranged in age from 13 to 20.” Id. Their names were Ozie Powell,
Willie Roberson, Andy Wright, Olen Montgomery, Haywood Patterson, Charles Weems,
Clarence Norris, Roy Wright, and Eugene Williams. N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park
Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1315, 1320, 1334 (2004) (discussing the deeply imbedded myth in American culture that
black men are “animalistic, sexually unrestrained, inherently criminal, and ultimately
bent on rape”).
108
Powell, 287 U.S. at 72.
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Powell was a watershed case. For the first time the Court held that, even
without an express request for counsel, the lack of lawyering in the “critical
period” of pretrial client consultation and fact investigation violated due
process—at least where the defendants were young, illiterate, far from
home, and on trial for their lives.109 “No attempt was made to investigate.
No opportunity to do so was given.”110 The cases went forward “with the
haste of the mob.”111 The defendants had no meaningful right to be heard.112
In such circumstances, the right to timely appointment of counsel was
held to be fundamental—a prerequisite for preserving the “liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”113 The
Court justified this newly articulated due process guarantee with what has
become a time-tested methodology: listening to the choir. The Court
assessed the degree to which consensus had developed on this issue as
evidenced in state constitutions, legislative enactments, and case law.114
Although the analogy may be problematized—a task not taken up here—
the Court’s methodology has affinities with the process of reflective
equilibrium that is essential to Adler’s prioritarian social welfare economic
theory. As a reminder, reflective equilibrium is the reasoning process
through which premises are confirmed or modified when tested against
competing views and real-world facts.115 The Powell Court used a similar
approach in assessing the state of convergent, cross-jurisdictional
preferences on the question of the right to appointed counsel.

109

Id. at 5758, 71.
Id. at 58.
111
Id. But see id. at 7576 (Butler and McReynolds, JJ., dissenting) (discussing pretrial
motions and trial tactics undertaken by defense attorneys, including cross-examination of
complaining witnesses).
112
Id. at 67 (majority opinion).
113
Id. (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
114
Id. at 7273.
115
See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
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The Court surveyed the jurisdictional landscape over time and space and
found that by 1932, when the Court ruled on the due process issue, the
federal government and the states uniformly mandated judicial appointment
of counsel for indigent capital defendants.116 The Court also discovered that
the majority of states required appointment of counsel for any defendant
facing any criminal charge for which he could not afford to hire a defense
attorney.117 Probing more deeply beneath these converging mandates, the
Court also detected an underlying “immutable principle” binding fairness to
equality.118 That principle was rooted in a type of inequality aversion
consistent with Adler’s version of a social welfare decision-making process.
Here, the target was reduction of disparities in knowledge, power, and skill
that exist between an individual criminal defendant and a prosecuting
authority.119
On that point, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had issued a hearty national
back-patting as early as 1910. In Hack v. State, that Court described a
playing field that had been at least leveled for indigent defendants, if not
affirmatively tipped in their favor:
Thanks to the humane policy of the modern criminal law . . . if [a
defendant] be poor, he may have counsel furnished him by the
state . . . ; not infrequently he is thus furnished counsel more able
than the attorney for the state.120
The Powell majority was less overtly sanguine about the quality of
representation provided to indigent criminal defendants. The Court
nevertheless read the available empirical data in a similar spirit. Like the
court in Hack, the majority Justices in Powell invoked American colonial
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Powell, 287 U.S. at 73.
Id.
118
Id. at 7273.
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See id.
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Hack v. State, 124 N.W. 492, 494 (Wis. 1910).
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rebellion against the English common-law notion that defense attorneys
were unnecessary in felony cases because trial judges would protect
defendants’ interests.121
Until 1836, English law allowed civil litigants and misdemeanor-level
criminal defendants to hire counsel if they could afford to do so. In contrast,
defendants facing felony charges—and therefore a possible death
sentence—could hire counsel only to address questions of law.122 This odd
arrangement was anathema to many. As one American colonial critic noted,
“It is manifest that there is as much necessity for counsel to investigate
matters of fact, as points of law, if truth is to be discovered.”123 The Powell
opinion echoed that refrain. The Court repeatedly emphasized the critical
duties of pretrial client consultation and fact investigation as unique to the
defense function.124
The Court’s focus here was not merely on counsel’s utility in terms of
equality enhancement and procedural fairness. Powell also championed the
intimate relationship between the individual defendant and the advocate
dedicated to advancing his interests. Trial judges, the Court noted,
cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or
participate in those necessary conferences between counsel and
accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the
confessional.125
The Court struck a similarly elegiac tone in Avery v. Alabama. While
rejecting the defendant’s right-to-counsel claim under Powell, the Avery

121
Powell, 287 U.S. at 61 (citing 1 COOLEY’S CONST. LIM. 8th ed., 698, et seq., and
notes); cf. Hack, 124 N.W. at 494.
122
Powell, 287 U.S. at 61.
123
Id. at 63 n.1.
124
Id. at 63.
125
Id. at 61.
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Court nevertheless ascribed a “peculiar sacredness”126 to the constitutional
guarantee at issue. Such sonorous language may have derived in part from
the Powell Court’s express reliance upon existing state constitutional,
statutory, and judicial mandates for appointing counsel.127 At a deeper level,
the language may derive from a radical commitment, too often honored in
the breach, to the same confluence of fairness and equality toward which
Adler’s theory aims.
The Court’s invocation of state consensus on the right to appointed
counsel did not end with Powell and Avery.128 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the
Court applied similar reasoning in holding that the Sixth Amendment, as
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, mandated appointment of
counsel in state felony cases.129 Gideon is viewed with Powell as a
watershed case and has far overshadowed Douglas v. California,130 decided
the same day.
Douglas arose when two codefendants were convicted of thirteen serious
felonies. The defendants were tried together after their motions to continue
and to obtain separate, conflict-free counsel were denied.131 Applying a
state rule of criminal procedure, the intermediate appellate court rejected the
126

Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447 (1940) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 37475 (1892)).
127
See Powell, 287 U.S. at 7273.
128
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 46263, 46768 (1938) (quoting Powell and
Hack with approval; holding that, absent a knowing and voluntary waiver, the failure to
appoint counsel for indigent federal defendants violates the Sixth Amendment and divests
the trial court of jurisdiction). But see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465, 47273 (1942)
(rejecting claim that Fourteenth Amendment due process clause incorporated the Sixth
Amendment by guaranteeing a fundamental right to appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants facing state felony charges; finding such diverse state approaches that federal
constitution should not “straitjacket[]”).
129
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). See also David Cole, Gideon v.
Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STORIES 101, 10102 (Carol B. Steiker ed., 2006) (discussing the history of Gideon).
130
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
131
Id. at 35354.
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defendants’ request for appointed counsel to handle their appeals.132 That
court affirmed the convictions, and the state Supreme Court denied petitions
for review.133 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
constitutionality of the procedural rule allowing appellate courts to deny
requests for appointed counsel based on judicial review of the record and a
conclusion that appointed counsel would yield no “advantage” to
defendants or the courts.134
The Douglas Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment required appointment of counsel on direct
appeal in states that offer direct appeal as of right.135 Examining the
decision in light of Adler’s social welfare decision-making procedure
reveals that the majority expressly championed the conjunction of
inequality-aversion and fairness. The targeted “evil” was “discrimination
against the indigent. For there can be no equal justice where the kind of an
appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of money he has.’”136 To force
indigents through “a gantlet” that the rich could evade “did not comport
with fair procedure.”137
Although the analysis here barely skims the doctrinal surface, it appears
that in these early right-to-counsel cases inequality aversion targeted the
incommensurate power, position, and resources of an individual vis-à-vis
the concentrated legal authority of government to charge, prosecute,
convict, and strip away liberty or life. Methodologically, the Court was no
diva dominating the stage. Instead, a harmonizing federal top-note joined
the states’ majoritarian chorus. Further investigation and analysis should
continue testing the hypothesis that early right-to-counsel jurisprudence
132

Id.
Id. at 354.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 35556.
136
Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
137
Id. at 357.
133
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may be an object lesson in the identification and vindication of convergent
preferences that prioritize the interests of the less well-off.
B. Expansion, Weak Enforceability, and Triage
The foregoing analysis applies Adler’s methodology to identify
inequality-averse convergent interests at work in the development of
constitutional right-to-counsel doctrine. But that doctrinal development has
also incited a fair amount of discord. One dissenting Justice in Douglas
decried the majority’s mandate for appointment of appellate counsel as
“utter extravagance and a waste of the State’s funds . . . an intolerable
burden on the State’s judicial machinery.”138
Argersinger v. Hamlin, which extended Gideon to misdemeanor cases,139
contained a more detailed fiscal note.140 Concurring in the judgment,
Justices Powell and Rehnquist advocated a flexible due process approach
instead of a bright-line Sixth Amendment mandate for appointment of
counsel in misdemeanor cases.141 They warned that “hundreds of
communities in the United States with no or very few lawyers [and] with
meager financial resources” would be unable to fulfill their Sixth
Amendment duties.142
Such worries were well-founded. They have been voiced repeatedly and
with increasing urgency as the right to appointed counsel has expanded

138

Id. at 359 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S.
654, 658, 674 (2002) (extending Argersinger to probation cases with potential for
incarceration). See generally Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 31012
(2011) (describing varying levels of compliance with duty to appoint misdemeanor
counsel).
140
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 4661 (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
141
Id. at 6061.
142
Id.
139
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substantively and across procedural phases of case development.143 Today,
the right comprises juvenile as well as adult representation144 and includes
the critical periods of pretrial investigation and communication,
arraignment, trial, and direct appeal. The right also touches upon additional
pretrial settings,145 including plea-bargaining,146 sentencing,147 first-tier
petitions for discretionary appellate review,148 state post-conviction
proceedings,149 and advice on the collateral consequence of deportation that
attaches to any potential plea agreement.150
Yet, in a pattern typical of other constitutional criminal procedure
guarantees,151 a substantively meaningful right to appointed counsel has
been only weakly enforceable since Strickland v. Washington established an
ex post performance-and-prejudice standard for evaluating counsel’s
constitutional effectiveness.152 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
143

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (imposing due process duty to appoint counsel
for indigent juveniles facing delinquency proceedings that could result in loss of liberty).
145
See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008).
146
See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 139091 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.
Ct. 1399, 141011 (2012).
147
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 39099 (2000) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
148
See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 61011 (2005) (applying Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), to require appointment of counsel for plea-sentenced
defendants seeking first-tier discretionary appellate review).
149
See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320–21 (2012) (finding ineffective assistance
of counsel on first-tier collateral review may establish cause to overcome procedural
default defense to federal habeas claim); see also Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927
(2012) (applying holding in Martinez where post-conviction counsel abandoned client
without notice).
150
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (holding that constitutionally
effective assistance requires advising defendants on collateral consequence of deportation
related to plea offer).
151
See Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and
Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1341–46 (2012) (discussing weak enforceability of
prosecutors’ due process duty to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
152
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
144
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Penalty Act further undercut enforceability by restricting federal habeas
access, slamming a crucial procedural door to many ineffective assistance
claims.153
An abundant literature documents the resulting regulatory shortcomings
and their contribution to crises in the underfunding and overloading of
indigent defense service systems across the country.154 That analysis will
not be repeated here. It suffices to say that Strickland’s bar for
constitutionally effective assistance is so low that lawyers have hurdled it
while habitually drunk,155 while sleeping during trial,156 and (despite being
awake and presumably sober) while failing to investigate and present
readily available evidence of actual innocence in a capital murder case.157
153

See, e.g., John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of
Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435,
44456 (2011) (contesting evidence and argument for eliminating habeas access for most
prisoners in Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 81833 (2009)); Justin F. Marceau,
Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 85,
13346 (2012) (same). By requiring appointment of counsel for plea-sentenced
defendants seeking discretionary review, and by softening procedural default rules that
might otherwise foreclose federal habeas relief due to failures of state post-conviction
counsel, the Court is holding states accountable for failing to provide effective counsel to
litigate ineffective assistance claims against trial and appellate lawyers. See Halbert, 545
U.S. at 61011; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 132021. The Court appears to be pushing more
responsibility onto the states to improve representation, or at least to ensure that
ineffective assistance claims can be fully litigated in state court. Halbert also hints at
some resurgence of the inequality-aversion principle that animated Douglas v. California.
See Halbert, 545 U.S. at 61011.
154
For examples, see supra note 4.
155
Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 960 (2001)
(affirming death sentence despite feeling “troubled” at capital defense attorney’s admitted
“decades-long habit” of drinking “twelve ounces of rum” each night during trial); see
also Ronald R. Tabak, Why An Independent Appointing Authority is Necessary to Choose
Counsel for Indigent People in Capital Punishment Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105,
111213 (2003).
156
See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 62325 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1575 (2012) (discussing “sleeping lawyer” jurisprudence).
157
See Scanlon v. Harkleroad, 740 F. Supp. 2d 706, 72830 (M.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d per
curiam, 467 Fed. Appx. 164 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 164 (2012) (finding
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Such doctrinal and empirical data lead to a depressed and depressing
view of indigent defense systems. Without succumbing to the general
malaise, leading criminal justice scholar Ronald Wright summarized the
grim state of affairs: “Year after year, in study after study, observers find
remarkably poor defense lawyering . . . and they point to lack of funding as
the major obstacle to quality defense lawyering.”158
Some commentators, viewing Gideon’s promise as broken and without
meaningful hope of repair, champion triaged public defense services. They
urge investment of resources where, in their view, those investments will
yield the biggest bang for the buck: death penalty cases, felonies, and cases
involving a viable claim of actual innocence.159 Former prisoner and
longtime justice activist Susan Burton suggests a very different tactic. She
proposes that defendants and defenders change the broken system by
crashing it.160 Burton sees no other avenue toward productive change than

trial counsel ineffective in guilt/innocence phase, but denying defendant new trial due to
lack of prejudice). The author represented Petitioner Donald Scanlon in state and federal
appellate and post-conviction challenges to his convictions and death sentence. Id. at 708.
158
Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 221 (2004). Wright proposes advocacy of parity
between prosecutorial and defense functions as an effective strategy for reform. Id. at
253–62.
159
But see Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for
Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV.
931, 95973 (2010) (critiquing proposals for triaging or reassigning defense services
proposed in, for example, Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise
of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2005) and Darryl
K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional
Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 816–25 (2004)); see also Benjamin H. Barton &
Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 967, 990–95 (2012) (arguing for triage in counsel appointments).
160
Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justicesystem.html?_r=0.
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the collective monkeywrenching of the machinery through refusal of plea
offers and insistence on taking cases to trial.161
Both suggestions are subject to criticism. With respect to the triage
approach, it is well settled that a governmental threat to individual liberty
through criminal prosecution triggers the leveling counterweight of
appointed counsel for indigent defendants.162 Triage proponents tack too far
toward the utilitarian in their willingness to sacrifice the individual to the
aggregate good. Susan Burton acknowledges similar objections to her
proposal that defendants crash criminal justice systems through collective
insistence on the right to trial.163
Another avenue—and one perhaps consistent with Professor Adler’s
continuous prioritarian moral decision-making procedure—is to examine
closely those centers of indigent defense that strive for excellence, seeking
to understand why they work as well as they do despite many reasons to
expect failure.164 Particular scrutiny is warranted where community defense
161

Id.
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (requiring appointed
counsel for indigent defendants facing felony charges); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967)
(imposing due process duty to appoint counsel for indigent juveniles facing delinquency
proceedings that could result in loss of liberty); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27
(1972) (extending Gideon to misdemeanor cases involving the risk of incarceration).
163
See Alexander, supra note 160. A softer approach involves litigation aimed at courtordered increases in funding or reductions in defender caseloads. See, e.g., State v. Peart,
621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993). On the limited effect of Peart-style actions, see Note:
Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense
Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 17421745 (2005). But see Cara H. Drinan, The Third
Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 458–
75 (2009) (outlining effective strategies for repairing the right to client counsel).
164
See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154,
179, 182–83 (2012) (discussing superior outcomes in Philadelphia murder cases
involving public defense attorneys over members of the private bar); Jonathan A.
Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using Organizational Culture to Reform
Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177, 21318 (2008) (discussing leadership
development as an effective strategy for reform); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Taking it to the
Streets, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 153, 16566, 165–66 & n.51 (2004)
162
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or similar collaborative efforts address root causes of crime and
punishment.165 Such efforts include the promotion of early intervention
programs with pregnant women and young children; increased access to
quality education, stable employment, safe housing, and drug and mental
health treatment; and the transportation services necessary to access these
resources.166
Not coincidentally, such systemic reforms can help cure the democracy
deficit at the intersection of crime, race, and poverty by strengthening
capacities to criticize existing norms and structures, to organize across lines
of race and class, and to advocate successfully for meaningful change.167 In
working toward that goal, scholars and activists who seek to identify and
promote sustainable conditions for grounding an effective oppositional
politics in the context of criminal justice reform and, more specifically,
public defense reform may find a helpful resource in Professor Adler’s
pioneering work. His unique incorporation of inequality aversion and
fairness as pivotal analytical tools may prove to be an important
contribution to the reframing of theoretical and practical arguments for
reform.

V. CONCLUSION
Well-Being and Fair Distribution is a closely-reasoned and provocative
contribution to the literature at the highly contested intersection of law,
moral philosophy, and economic theory. Professor Adler’s rich
(discussing “stellar” reputations of some defender offices; citing Cait Clarke, ProblemSolving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the Conceptual and Institutional
Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 401, 44854
(2001)).
165
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 164, at 18094 (describing Seattle Defender
Association’s Racial Disparity Project).
166See, e.g., Moore, Democracy Enhancement, supra note 18 (discussing effectiveness of
early intervention and other prevention strategies).
167
See id.
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interdisciplinary discussion is an intriguing new resource for academicians
and activists working at another intersection—the distinctively intransigent
national intersection of crime, race, and poverty. For fifty years, Gideon v.
Wainwright has stood as a constitutional marker at that intersection.
But as a banner for change, Gideon has wavered more than waved. The
arrested development of the right to appointed counsel bespeaks a
complicated doctrinal history and an ongoing struggle over fairness and
equality—a struggle akin to the reflective equilibrium process that is
integral to Adler’s continuous prioritarian social welfare function. Further
research should more thoroughly probe this connection, including the
possibility that recent Supreme Court decisions such as Halbert v.
Michigan168 auger a resurgent inequality-averse doctrine grounded in the
due process-equal protection line of right-to-counsel cases.169
As the struggle for quality public defense services continues, Adler’s
novel approach to justice issues could become a powerful influence,
particularly if his methodology is adapted to prioritize democracy
enhancement. Such a focus could help shift grasstop reform—that is, efforts
driven by elites on behalf of the less well-off—toward grassroots change
that empowers low income people and people of color to participate more
directly in the formation, implementation, and oversight of the criminal
justice policies in which indigent defense services play such a critical role.

168

545 U.S. 605, 61011 (2005) (requiring appointment of counsel for plea-sentenced
defendants seeking first-tier discretionary appellate review).
169Id.; see also supra note 153 (discussing equal protection analysis in Halbert); cf.
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1220-32 (2013) (arguing for equal protection-fundamental rights
strategy for public defense reform).
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